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A THEORY OF GRADUAL TRADE
LIBERALIZATION
ABSTRACT
Thispaper proposes a theoryofgradualtradeliberalization. Iconsider countries thatarc
limitedto self-enforcing arrangementsintheir trade relations.Iargue that enforcementproblems
associated with the maintenanceoflow cooperative tariffs are exacerbated by the presence of
resourcesin the import-competingsector that are(or potentiallycouldbe)earningrentsfrom
theirsector-specificskills. Intuitively, by being able to transform into rents a portion of what
otherwisewould be dead weight loss under a tariffhike,the presence of suchresources makes
deviation froma lowcooperative tariffto a high tariffmore desirable for thedeviatingcountry,
and makes punishments under reciprocally high tariffs less painful. Hence, the presence of rent-
collecting resources in an import-competing sector acts as a deterrent to trade liberalization.But
if aninitial "round of liberalizationcan induceat least a portion of these resources inthe
import-competing sector to relocatetothe rest of the economy, and if by not using theirsector-
specific skills these resources stand to lose them, then the enforcement issues associated with
their presence will also diminish over time, and further rounds of liberalization are made possible
by the effects of the initial round. I formalize this gradualprocessof trade liberalization, and








There aremanyquestionsthat arise in the theory of trade policywhich presuppose the
viewthat trade liberalization is a gradual, dynamicprocess. Anexample of great current
interest is the question of whether the proliferation of regional trade agreements might slow
down or speed up the process of multilateral trade liberalization under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but other examples abound. Trade adjustment assistance is
often defended on the grounds that it helps to facilitate the process of trade liberalization.
Political lobbies and labor unions representing import-competing interests are seen as
retarding the process of trade liberalization, while GAITs most-favored-nation principle is
perceived as spurring it on.
There are even important questions about the dynamics of the liberalization process
itself The GAiT process of on-going repeated 'rounds" of liberalization has been credited
with generating the momentum for the successful multilateral tariff-cutting experience of the
post-war period, and has lead to an informal "bicycle" theory of GAiT: unless you keep
pedalling, you will fall off (Bhagwati, 1988, p. 41). The bicycle view of GAiT also
underlies the concern shared by many regarding the likely consequences of a failure to bring
the (finally completed) Uruguay Round of GAiT negotiations to a successful conclusion (see
for example, Economic Report of The President, 1992, p. 193). This concern amounts to the
view that a failure to conclude the Uruguay Round would not simply have meant a
continuation of the status quo, but rather a retreat from existing levels of international
cooperation in trade policy.While the perceptionof tradeliberalization asa gradualprocessis pervasive, and
while answers to many of the central questions in the theory of trade policy require that the
process be thought of in this way, we have no satisfactory theory that would yield a gradual
process of trade liberalization as an endogenous outcome. The purpose of this paper is to
provide a theory of trade liberalization in which the process of liberalization is inherently
time-consuming. In the model I present below, partial liberalization today builds the
foundation for the possibility of further liberalization at some point in the future.
My starting point is the presumption that, among countries that are attempting
reciprocally to lower trade barriers, the inability to commit to policies that are jointly optimal
but individually suboptimal is a key ingredient which gives rise ultimately to a gradual trade
liberalization process. The idea that government commitment problems can lead to
gradualism in the reform process is not new. Dewatripont and Roland (1992) argue that a
governments inability to commit to its domestic agents not to use information revealed in a
partial reformfor the design of laterreforms can lead to gradualism in the optimal reform
path. Matsuyama(2990) shows thatif a government lacks commitment to an announced
liberalizationschedule in a game of timing between it and a domestic industry over whento
invest (the industry) and when to liberalize (the government), then equilibrium liberalization
may be delayed. However, neither paper focuses on the commitment problems that arise
internationally across governments, a focus which I adopt here and which seems particularly
appropriate when considering gradualism in multilateral trade liberalization.
In focussing on the commitment problems across countries associated with
international cooperation in trade policy, I ani building on the work of Jensen and Thursby
2(1984), Dixit (1987), Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 1993a, 1993b), and others. This work
adopts the view that enforcement issues are central to the dynamic behavior of trade policy in
a world where countries attempt to maintain cooperative trade policies and that, in practice.
the enforcement of agreed-upon behavior under GAiT is limited by the severity of retaliation
that can be credibly threatened against an offender by its trading partners. I therefore model
international cooperation in trade policy as necessarily self-enforcing, in that it involves
balancing the current gains from deviating unilaterally from an agreed-upon trade policy
against the future losses from forfeiting the benefits of multilateral cooperation that such a
unilateral defection would imply. What differentiates this paper from those before it and
what, when combined with issues of international policy commitment, leads to a model of
gradual trade liberalization, is that (i) I allow resources to change sectors in response to
changing tariff levels, and (ii) I consider the possibility that the sector-specific skills of
import-competing workers displaced by tariff reductions may depreciate over time!
In an unpublished paper that was brought to my attention after presentation of the first
draft of this paper at the Michigan conference, Devereux (1992) explores the two-way
interaction between trade liberalization and economic growth in a setting in which production
technologies are characterized by learning-by-doing and governments set tariffs in a repeated
game. Although Devereux's focus is on the relationship between economic growth and trade
liberalization, trade liberalization is characterized by a gradual process in his model. However,
gradualism does not emerge as an inherent part of the liberalization process itself, but rather
derives from the gradual process of learning by doing that is central to his model. That is, in
Devereux's model, while the maximal rate of trade liberalization is gradual, it is independent
of the actualrateof liberalization, depending fundamentally only on the dynamics of the
underlying learning-by-doing process in production: There is thus no link between the depth
of trade liberalization undertaken today and liberalization possibilities in the future. In the
model I develop here, the degree of current liberalization conditions future liberalization
possibilities at each point in time, so that.liberalization is an inherently dynamic and gradual
process. I thank Scott Taylor for bringing Devereux's paper to my attention.
3Within this setting, I explore how the government's incentive problem associated ssth
maintaining tow cooperative tariffs is exacerbated by the presence of resources in the import-
competing sector that are (or could potentially be) earning rents from their sector-specific
skills. Intuitively, by being able to capture the rents created by the government under a tariff
hike, the presence of such resources enhances the government's temptation to deviate from a
low cooperative tariff to a high tariff while it also reduces the pain of the reciprocally-high
tariff punishment that would follow such a deviation. Hence, the presence of rent-collecting
resources in an import-competing sector acts as a deterrent to trade liberalization. But this
suggests in turn that some initial progress in trade liberalization, which is sufficient to lead to
the relocation of a portion of the existing import-competing workers out of the import-
competing sector, might eventt1ly pave the way for greater trade liberalization in the future,
as the workers who leave the import-competing sector eventually lose their industry-specific
import-competing skills --andhence their ability to earn rents in the import-competing sector
were the government to return to a higher tariff. It is this dynamic coinplementarity which I
attempt to formalize in what follows.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section Il, I formalize the basic
incentive problem for trade liberalization that is created by the presence of rent-earning
import-competing workers in a stationary environment in which workers keep their import-
competing skills even if they are not currently working in the import-competing sector.
Section III then introduces the assumption that import-competing workers who leave the
sector face the possibility of losing their sector-specific skills, and characterizes the non-
stationary, gradual, process of trade liberalization that results. In Section IV, I apply the
4model to explore the notion that the failure of a round to achieve further liberalization may
leadto aretreat from existing levels of tariff' cooperation. Section V concludes.
II.A Stationary Model of Trade Liberalization
I consider two symmetric countries, a home(no*)country and a foreign(') country.
Each countrychooses import tariffs for itsimport-competingindustry, while its export
industrymust operateunder the importtariffs chosenbyits trading partner. Countries share
identical linear demands (a-P) for the product of each industry. Pmduction technologies in
these two industries are linear, using labor as thesoleinput: ineachindustry and ineach
country, oneunitofoutputcanbeproduced by one unit of effective laborinput.With tand f
denoting the (specific) impedimentsto trade into the import-competing industryofthehome
and foreigncountry, respectively, withWm W,,,, and denotingthe local wage per unit
of effective laborinthe import-competing andexportsector of thehomearid foreign country,
respectively, and with Pm F',, P,, andPdenoting the localpriceof the import-competing
and export good in the home and foreign country, respectively, I have
Wrn= m = = = (1)
=+ t; = + (2)
providedthat tandr •arenon-prohibitive. Finally, in addition to its export and import-
competingindustries, each country has a large rest-of-economysector.
5There are three types of labor in these economies. First, there are workers that are
particularly well-suited to work in the import-competing sector of their economy. Each of
these workersisendowed with I efficiency unit of labor which is equally productive in the
import-competing sector or in the rest-of-economy sector, but each such worker is also
endowed with y efficiency units of labor reflecting sector specific skills, i.e., worth nothing
outside the import-competing sector. I assume that there are e/(l +y) such workers in each
economy (and thus that their effective supply when employed in the import-competing sector
is e), and refer to them as "import-competing" workers. In addition, each economy has a
large supply of workers endowed with no sector-specific skills, which I refer to as 'rest-of-
economy' workers, who are endowed with I efficiency unit of non-sector-specific labor, and
whose supply into the import-competing sector is infrnitely elastic at the fixed rest-of-
economy market wage.Finally,production in the export sector of each economy also
requires special skills. I assume that each economy is endowed with E effective workers with
such skills, and that there is no possibility of intersectoral labor movement in or out of this
sector.
These assumptions allow me to focus on resource movements into and out of the
import-competing sector, and in particular on the issues raised when such resource
movements are an integral part of the process of trade liberalization. I ignore for now the
analogous resource movements that would arise into and out of the export sector, and
comment on their importance in the conclusion.
Each country's effective labor supply curve into its import-competing sector--and
hence its supply curve for the import-competing good--will look as depicted by the dashed
6tine in Figure I labeled S. The e effective import-competing workers will choose to locate in
the import-competing sector at an import price of w/(1÷y)or greater, and would choose to
locate in the rest-of-economy sector otherwise. Rest-of-economy workers would choose to
enter the import-competing sector at an import price of; or greater. Figure 1 also depicts
the linear product demand curve for the import-competing good by the dashed line labeled D,
drawn for the case in which the price of the import-competing good would rise to winthe
absence of trade. The difference between these two is the country's import demand, and is
represented in Figure 1 as the solid line labeled M.
I will be interested in the case where, facing free trade, a portion of a country's
import-competing workers would choose to locate in the rest-of-economy sector. In fact,
though inessential, it will prove convenient to assume that free trade would be just sufficient
to induce all import-competing workers to locate in the rest-of-economy sector. This amounts
to the assumption that each country's export sector is endowed with enough labor to satisf'v
the demand from both countries at a world price of w/(1 +y), or
.8?= — I——) (3) 1y
FigureI depicts the export supply curve under (3) by the solid line labeled X. The other
cases, in which (3) is violated with an inequality in either direction, are analytically messier
but not qualitatively different.
It is now straightforward to establish that equilibrium domestic prices as functions of













where (E-a+p;;)/ is the prohibitive tariff,andwith P,,(r)and P;(t) defined
symmetrically. Finally, domestic welfareis measured as the sum of consumer surplus,
producersurplus, and tariff revenue in the importsector,and consumer and producer surplus
in the export sector, or
P(t)





with foreign welfare W(t,c)definedsymmetrically.
A. Static Tariff Setting
1 am now ready to derive each country's optimal tariff. For simplicity in what follows.
I restrict my attention to situations where a country's optimal tariff leads toimport prices of
Sw, i.e.,prices which would bring a portion of the (infinitely elastically supplied) rest-of-
economy labor force into the import-competing sector. This amounts to a restriction on the
maximum size of e and y ,inparticular that
e<a —1+37p (7) 22(1+y)
Under (7), a countiys optimal tariff will be equivalent to that whichmaximizes tariffrevenue,
and is given by
=E-a+i =1/2. (8)
Moreover,with the two goods markets independent and with export taxes ruled out by
assumption, optimal tariff choices are independent of the tariff choices of one's trading
partner, as (8) indicates. Thus, defining the static tariff game to be.the game in which each
country simultaneously selects an import tariff to maximize its own welfare, the Nash
equilibrium of the static tariff game occurs when each country selects
=1/2. (9)
Despitethe simplicity of this set-up, it still yields the essential elements that I will
need to study the process of cooperative trade liberalization. In particular, it is readily
established using (6) that W(r=t','r'=t') is strictly decreasing in t'forttE(O,t), sothat the
static tariff game leads to a Prisoners' Dilemma: both countries are better off with symmetric
free trade, and monotonically better off with any symmetric move toward free trade, but in
9the Nashequilibriumboth countries impose positive tariffs andsufferthe consequent drop in
welfare.
This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the domestic gains from trade associated with the
import and export good are depicted in the iop left and right panel, respectively, and the
lowerpaneldepicts domestic and foreign tariff reaction curves. Under reciprocal free trade.
thegains fromtrade for thedomestic countryamount totheareaunderits import demand
curve (m1m,m6m, in the top left panel) and the area above its export supply curve (x1x1x, in
the top right panel). Under the domestic optimal tariff, the additional gains from importing
are given by the net tariff revenue collected from abroad minus the dead weight loss
(m2m3m4m5 minus m5m6tn,m! in the top left panel). Facing the optimal tariff abroad, the
reduction in the gains from exporting are given by the net import taxes paid toexporters and
the dead weight loss (x1x,x4x7 plus x7x4x5; in the top right panel). Taken together, when
both countries impose their optimal tariffs, the losses in each country'sexport market
outweigh the gains in its import market, with the net loss for the domestic country amounting
to the sum of the dead weight losses it incurs in each market (m5mm,m! plus x7x4x,x). The
lower panel of Figure 2 depicts domestic and foreign tariff reactioncurves, with domestic
indifference curves reflecting the relative welfare rankings associated withreciprocal free
trade, unilateral optimal tariff setting, and Nash equilibrium tariffs in the static tariffgame.
B.Dynamic Tariff Setting
Suppose now that, starting from their Nash tariffs, countries were given the
opportunity to cooperate in tariff policy, subject only to the condition that this cooperation be
self-enforcing. Such an opportunity might arise with the establishnent of an international
10organization such asGAiT,which hastheability to coordinate multilateralreductions in
tariffsbut no independent ability to enforce the agreed-upon reductions. I analyze such an
opportunity by considering now a stationary dynamic tariff game, which is defined by the
infinite repetition of the static tariff game just described. I refer to this games as stationary
because none of the model's parameters change through time. In particular, I maintain the
assumption for now that import-competing workers who choose to leave the import-competing
sector as a result of falling levels of protection nevertheless maintain their y units of import-
competing sector-specific skill if ever they wish to return to the import-competing sector,
I focus on a particular class of subgame perfect equilibria for the stationary dynamic
tariff game, in which (1) in equilibrium, the two countries select the same import tariff in each
period, and (ii) if a deviation from this common tariff occurs, then in the next period and
forever after, countries revert to the Nash equilibrium tariffs of the static tariff game. I define
the most-cooperative equilibrium of the stationary dynamic game as the subgame perfect
equilibrium which yields the lowest possible equilibrium tariff while satisfring (i) and (ii).
The corresponding tariff is called the most-cooperative tariff for the stationary dynamic tariff
game?
In a dynamic model, countries have the possibility of supporting a cooperative tariff.
c, sinceany attempt to raise one's current-period tariff will be met with the retaliatory
2Formsof punishment other than infinite Nash reversion might be considered, some of
which could support greater levels of cooperation. However, the qualitative nature of the
non-stationary behavior of cooperative tariffs derived below is unlikely to be affected.
Moreover, infinite reversion is not entirely implausible as a representation of actual tariff
wars. As one example, the high U.S. tariffs on imports of light-duty trucks imposed as a
result of the 'chicken war" with the European Community in 1963 are still in place 30 years
latcr.
II(Nash) tarifffromone's tradingpartner in future periods.Thus, a cooperativetariff tcanbe
supportedin anequilibrium for the stationary dynamic tariff game if the one-time incentive to
cheat issufficiently small relative tothe future value of maintaininga cooperativerelationship
withone'stradingpartner.
If a country cheats, it will deviate from tcandselectitsbest-responseNashtariff, t".
With this, the fundamental "no defect" condition which formalizes the intuition above can be
written as
W(v__tN, ttc) _W(t=tC, v'=tc) ￿ [W(t=tc,f=t°)-W(t=r,t'=ti)(10)
where ôc(O,1) isthe discount factor between periods.Itwillbeconvenient in what follows
to write this condition in the slightly different form of
w(t=tc,ts=tc)￿ (1—8) w(t=eN,t*=tc) + 8w(t=t',e=t")V(C=rc,6) (11)
Theright-hand-side of(Il), which I denote by flrrt,ô), is decreasing in rt for 6 <I
and r <f,and decreasing in 6 for r' <rN becausea country's welfare is decreasing in
the tariff of its trading partner.
In what follows, I will be interested in cases where the most cooperative tariff
satising (11) leads to the relocation of at least some of the e import-competing workers, all
of whom by (7) are content to stay in the import-competing sector under tN.Thisrequires
thattheequilibrium domestic import price under the most cooperative tariff be equal to
w/(l +y) which,accordingto (4), implies that the most cooperative tariff must satis&
12cc < (12)
This will amount to a restriction on the minimal size of 6 which I will characterize
momentarily. Under therestriction(12),it is easily checked from (6) that
W(ttc,t*tc)p((a)2
— — _____ (13)
= Put)2 — + ._L.f —(j)2 (14)
W(t=,t*tc)=p1(S)2+Y22 e)2 + _-!-_?(e-a) + ___
P2(1+y)2 1-'-y
(15)
..(aJf)C+ (tc)2) P iy 2
The determination of themost-cooperativetariff i[0,i] is now illustrated in Figure
3. From (13), W(r=rC,t*=t5isdecreasing and concave in cC over t¼[0,], while from
(II),(14) and (15), P1c'=rC,a) is decreasing and convex in tt over this range. For
8 = 1, and flc'=t',6) must intersect the y-axis of Figure 3
below W(t=0,r=0). For 6 of this magnitude, free trade can be supported in the stationary
dynamic game, since the incentive constraint (11) is met with strict inequality for t =r =0.
As 6 is reduced from I, FtttC,6) shifts up in Figure 3, and its intersection with the y-axis
rises above W(t=tNt. N) The critical 6 below which free trade cannot be supported is
defined implicitly by W(t=0,t=0) = 1'r'=t"=04).As6 is reduced from !, V(t=rc,a)
'3continues to shiftupin Figure 3,and its intersection with W(r=tC,r*=tc) yields
monotonicallyincreasing valuesfor .It can beshown that there exists a critical
defined implicitly by VCv=i,r=) =i'lt=t'=tj)such that the most cooperative tariffin
thestationary dynamic game with discount factoris= t. Figure3,then, depictsthe
determination of te(O,t) under the assumption that 8c(o,ô).
In what follows, I concentrate on discount factors in this range, because I am
interested in trade liberalization which (i) would induce some of the resources originally
located in the import-competing sector to relocate (which requires 8 > 8) and, (ii) cannot be
'completed' in a single "round" of tariff cuts (which requires 8 < 8). The next section
introduces non-stationarity into the model in an attempt to remove the quotes from (ii) above.
ILLA Non-Stationary Model of Trade Liberalization
ThemovementfromN to t illustrated in Figure 3 could be thought of as
representingtheprocess of trade liberalization that comes about when countries move from a
non-cooperative to a cooperative trading regime. Theproblemis, it's not much of a process.
or at least not one that oughtto takeany time.
However,theelements of a non-trivial process of trade liberalization, with current
liberalizationsettingup the prospects for further liberalization sometime in the future, do
14suggest themselves if one considers the impact of a drop inthe supply of import-competing
workers (e) on the sustainable stationary cooperative tariff t. Using (13), (14), and (15),
defining te1 /f3 in analogy with (12), and refening to Figure 3, W(r=tt,c'=t5is
unaffecteU by a change from e1 to e2, e1 >e2,for rtE[O,2]whileV(ttc,o) would shift
down with the drop in e, leading to a fall in t. Recalling that V( )issimply a weighted
average of welfare under defection and under Nash punishments,the downward shift in V(
as e drops reflects the fact that high tariffs become less desirable astheir capacity to generate
rents diminishes.
Thus, in this stationary dynamic model, resources in the import-competing sector that
are (or could potentially be) earning rents from their sector-specificskills limit the degree of
attainable trade liberalization. The intuition for this result is that, by being able to transform
into rents a portion of what otherwise would have been dead weight loss under atariff hike,
the presence of such resources makes deviation from a low cooperative tariff to a hightariff
more desirable for the deviating country, and makes punishments under reciprocallyhigh
tariffs less painful. But this in turn suggests that liberalization, which leads to therelocation
of some of the existing import-competing workers, might eventually feed back uponitself and
pave the way for further liberalization, if theworkers who leave the import-competing sector
eventually see their industry-specific skills from the import-competingsector--and hence their
ability to earn rents in the sector should the government return to a higher tariff--depreciate
over time from lack of use. This is the logic underlying what follows.
ISI now assumethat each country's import-competingsector begins with e1/(1 +y)
workers,each of whom owns I unitof effective labor equally efficient in either the import-
competing orrest-of-economysector, and y units ofeffectivelabor tailoredfor use only in
theimport-competing sector. In any period,alter observing the foreign anddomestic tariff
choicesforthatperiod,any worker currentlyinthe import-competing sectormaychooseto
leave the sector andworkin the rest-of-the-economysectorwhere hewouldreceive the
market wage w. However, should a worker choose to leave the import-competing sector,
then ineveryperiod that he is gonefromthe import-competing sector, there is a constant
probability A that his specificskillintheimport-competing sectorwill depreciateto zero.
Oncethis depreciation occurs, the worker's effectiveness in the import-competingsector
becomes like that of all other workers currently in the rest of the economy, and he amounts
to 1 unit of effective labor in either the import-competing or rest-of-the-economy sectors. I
assume that the possibility of skill depreciation occurs at the beginning of each period; that all
workers currently in the rest-of-the-economy sector who ended the previous period with their
import-competing skills in tact either loose or keep their y units of import-competing skill
together; that whether these workers keep or loose their skills becomes common knowledge
immediately after it is determined; that, after observing this, foreign and domestic
governments then set tariffs for the period simultaneously; and that, observing those tariff
choices, workers then choose where to locate for the period's production.
If equilibrium protection in the import-competing sector moved non-monotonically
through time, an import-competing worker's sectoral location decision would now involve
16potentially complex intertemporal calculations, since the possibility of sector-specific skill
depreciation while outside the import-competing sector creates an option value to staying in
the sector. To avoid this complication I will stick to cases of monotonic trade liberalization,
leaving nonmonotonic movements as an interesting area for future work.
In order to characterize this nonstationary model, I now define the stt of the import-
competing sector by the effective import-competing labor supply, e, remaining in the
economy at a point in time, i.e., the effective labor force in the economy that, at a moment in
time, still retains the import-competing skill. Let i =1,2,...index the history of states, so that
e1 denotes the initial state of the import-competing sector, and e denotes the state after i-I
episodes of skill depreciation. By an episode of skill depreciation, I am referring to a period
in which the most recent cohort of import-competing workers who have chosen to work
outside the import-competing sector as a result of the preceding "round" of liberalization lose
their sector-specific skills.
In analyzing this non-stationaz dynamic tariff game, I then examine a class of
subgame perfect equilibria in which (i) along the equilibrium path, and for any given state of
the import-competing sector, the foreign and domestic countries select a common import tariff <
atall dates associated with that state; and (ii) if at any point in the game a deviation from the
equilibrium tariff for the corresponding state occurs, then in the next period and forever
thereafter the two countries revert to the Nash equilibrium tariffs of the static tariff game.
To solve this non-stationary model recursively, I will restrict my attention to cases in
which free trade is achievable in a finite number of states, or "rounds" of liberalization, with
17the number denoted by n.3 Once again, this amounts to a restriction on the minimum value of 5
for a given e1, and it ensures that ; will also satis' (12) for each i =1,2,...,n-1(if e didn't
satis& (12) for iE(1,2,...n—1}, then liberalization would end after the P" round with a positive
tariff). Given this, I look for the most-cooperative equilibrium, and solve for the
corresponding most-coooerative liberalization path,{tf,i,..t), in a recursive fashion starting
with round n-I and requiring that each incentive constraint bind back to round I.
As before I restrict e1 to satisfy (7). Since e,>1 can only decline from e1 (1 do not
allow workers to obtain the import-competing skill if they don't have it, nor would they have
an equilibrium incentive to do so), this means that the Nash tariff, to which a country would
defect if it so chose and to which both countries would revert after a defection, is state-
invariant and continues to be defined by (8). Finally, note that, given these restrictions and
the monotonic liberalizations on which I focus, import-competing workers who contemplate
leaving the import-competing sector in a given period need only base their equilibrium
decision on that period's tariff choices, since equilibrium tariffs will only fall in subsequent
periods.
I now need to distinguish between the effective supply of workers with import-
competing skills who are employed in the import-competing sector and the economy-wide
effective supply of such workers (e1). Denoting by e the effective force of workers with
Hence, for a period in state i, the i round of liberalization has occurred, and
governments are waiting for the state to change, i.e., for an episode of skill depreciation, so
that the ihil round can proceed.
18import-competing skills that choose to remain in the import-competing sector for a given
periodin state iafter domestic and foreign governments have set their tariffs for the period, it
is direct to calculate that
= I = 1,2 n (16)
along the equilibrium path. Moreover, since these c workers will be the only ones to retain
their import-competing skills when the state of the import-competing sector advances to 1+1,
i.e., when the skills of the c -cworkers who chose to leave the import-competing sector
as a result of the liberalization in round i depreciate, they define that state:
= I = 1,2 n—i (17)
Substituting (16) into (17) yields
= I = 1,2 n—i (18)
While (16) and (18) depict the allocational decisions of import-competing workers and
the state of the import-competing sector as a function of current and lagged equilibrium
tariffs, respectively, I also need to consider the behavior of workers if either country were to
deviate from the equilibrium tariff tandplay '.Ifworkers observed a government
playing pq,thenall workers with import-competing skills in the deviating country would
return to enjoy the rents in that period and in all future periods. However, all workers with
import-competing skills in the other (non-deviating) country might not return in that period to
the import-competing sector, since their government is still (for that period) playing a low
19cooperative tariff at which they can not all earn the reservation wage. However, if these
workers choose not to return until their government reverts to tt" next period, they risk
loosing their import-competing skills. In what follows, I assume that this latter effect
dominates, so that in the event that either country is observed to play tN,allimport-
competing workers with import-competing skills in both countries return to their import-
competing sector. This assumption allows me to avoid asymmetries across countries that
would add further to the complexity of the problem, but the assumption is otherwise
inesscntial. I thus have
=eif t=t" and/or t=ehl. (19)
Nowconsider the welfare associated with the various tariff choices. In the stationary
model of the previous section 1 defined W(t=t',r=t'), W(r=V,t=tM), and
W(t =t",c '=tc) in(13), (14), and (15), respectively. In that model, e played the role of e1 in















To derivethe incentive constraint analogous to (10), 1 now define Z1,the discounted welfare
undercooperative tariffs into the infinite future as viewed from a period in state i. by
ôX(w11 (t',1, $.) + 6A(w12 (ti.2, ti,2)
+ 8Mw1,3 +.1 + 8 (1—A) (w142 (ti,2, t7,2) +.
+ o i—{w1,(ti,1,4.)+ 8Mw1,2(4.2,4.2) +.
+ 8(1—A){w441(ti,i,ti.i)+.I I1+ 8 (i—A) {w1(4,4)
+ 8Mw1,1 + 6Mw142(4.2,ti,2) + .
+ 8(1—A){w1,1(t7,1,tI,1) + ... H + 8(1—A) {w1(4,t)
+6Mw1,1 (ti,1, 4,) + . . . I + 8(1—A) {w1 (4,4) + . . .
where I adopt the convention that= t and = W forj￿n-i. Theincentive
constraintfor t, ic{In} is then
Wi (e",4, t1) — W1(4,4)￿z1——1w1 (1N, eN,t51) (23)
Startingwithroundn, (23) defines the range oft1that is consistent with
t:(ti)=o. For i=n, future tariffs are stationary (at zero) along the equilibilum path, arid4
is simply ___W(r=O,t=O).Thus,(23) becomes
21Wn(tO,tO)￿(1_6)Wo(tuJ,tnC,tnCl)+ 6w0(V,ttl,t..1) (24)
Using(24), and noting that the left-hand side of (24) is independent of t1 while the right-
hand side is increasing in r1, t(t_1)O is attainable for r_1E(O,ti],witht_1 defined
implicitlyby
W0(eg=O,trO) = (1—6) Wfl(t",f=O,C..L) +
To characterize the most-cooperative tariffforearlier rounds,it isusefulto rewritethe
incentiveconstraintin analternative form:
—w1(t7,tff) ￿
(1-A) w1(t7, 4) + A(P11,1 (4,,t7)+ZJ,1]) (25)
—6r,faNaN C
With some manipulation, (25) canbeshown to be equivalent to (23).For inI,(25)
becomes
P1,,1 (4.1, 41) (1—6(1—A)] ((1—6) fr?0.1 (t", 4.1 t2) +6w,,1 (IN, V'. t2)
— (26)
Using(26), and notingthat the left-hand side of (26) isindependent of t2 whilethe right-
hand side is increasing in t.2, the maximum r..2 consistent with(t1(r..2))=O, denoted




1 Then for t2c[t_1,;_2j,t_1(r_2)is defined by
W,,1 (t°1C)=1-6 (1-A)[(1-6) W(fl c t2) +ÔW,,1(t",eN, t2)] n—i•'n—I 1-6
— _2Wn(tc=OfcO (27) I,I 1I
Since theright-hand side of (27) is increasing in r2while the left-hand side is independent
oft.2, andsinceat t..1 the right-hand side of (27) mustdeclinein t1 at a faster rate than
the left hand side of(27), t1(t2) is increasing in r2.
Finally,foric{n-2,...I}, Iusethe fact that (23) must hold with equality at t(r..1) for
ie {n-I1} along the equilibrium most-cooperative liberalization path. Thus, evaluating (23)
for i+l at tt.1(r), multiplying both sides by
6A
, and subtracting it from (25) for i,
1-6(1—A)
with ie{n-21), yields
23I [Pt1 (t", t, 4) — P?1 (4,4) +1 (V'. fN, 4)
— (P?1,1 (, tf,1 (4) , 4) + __w1,1Ct1, ?",4)1
U1(4,
(28)
fori€{n-2,..., 1). Starting with i=n-2 and workingbackto 1=1,1 canthen definet(t1)by




Again, since U1()is increasing in t..1 while F$(t,t) is independent of r1, and since at
U1()must decline in t at a faster rate thanW(r7,t), £7(t..1) isincreasing in t1.
as Figure 4 depicts. It can also be shown that
t7(t1)?71(t51)for.1 EC2,,n) (30)
This ensures that e7(r71) is continuous over the entire interval [O4].
Figure 5 depicts the most-cooperative trade liberalization path starting from a tariff to,
under the assumption that free trade is achievable from r3 in n rounds of liberalization. The
left hand quadrant depicts t(t1) as a continuous and increasing function lying below the
2445 line. Thefigure illustratesa t0 which can be liberalized in 6 rounds. The righthand
quadrantdisplays the most-cooperative path of liberalization, starting from t0,thatis implied
by £ (t,1).Theinitial liberalization from to to finducesa portion of the import-
competing workers to leave the sector and move to the rest of the economy, where their
import-competing skills are at risk of depreciating. Once their skills depreciate, and the
workers lose their ability to seek rents in the import-competing sector in the event of a return
to high tariffs, the enforcement issues associated with sustaining the tariff level t are
mitigated, making possible the next round of liberalization, which results in tariff reductions
to t. This round of liberalization induces a portion of the remaining import-competing
workers to leave the sector and move to the rest of the economy, placing their import-
competing skills at risk of depreciating, and the process of liberalization continues,
LV. The 'Bicycle' Theory
In the previous sections, 1 developed a model of trade liberalizing rounds in which the
process of trade liberalization is gradual. All else equal, the greater the amount of rent-
generating resources that will be displaced when the liberalization is completed, the longer
will be the process of liberalization, and the greater will be the number of rounds required to
bring it about. In this section, I return to one of the central questions which motivated this
paper, and examine the implications of the "failure' of a round for current levels of
multilateral tariff cooperation. As discussed in the Introduction, there is a widely held view
25that failure to move forward in multilateral liberalization will not simply mean the end of
further liberalization, but must lead as well to a retreat from present levels of cooperation. 1
now examine that view within the context of the model developedabove. In particular, I ask
whether the achievements of the previous round can be sustained in a period in which the
(premature) end of the liberalization process becomes apparent.
In the model developed thus far, new rounds occur whenever import-competing
workers who haveleftthe import-competing sector as a result of the previous round's
liberalization lose their import-specific skills, and hence lose their ability to earn rents in the
import-competing sector in the event the government were to renege on the promise of low
cooperative tariffs to which it agreed in the previous round. This reduction in the rent-
generating potential of tariff hikes relaxes the incentive constraint that defines the most
cooperative tariff in any period, and allows countries to liberalize further.
I now introduce the assumption that both governments must also have the political
will" to engage in a new round of tariff liberalization: without this political will, the slack
created in the incentive constraint by the process I have modeled above would go unused in
supporting further liberalization. While admittedly ad hoc, the introduction of political vill in
this way allows me to consider the possibility that the necessary conditions for a successful
round might one day fail to materialize. In particular, I assume that governments begin the
process of liberalization in possession of this political will, but that ineach period, after the
state of the import-competing sector for the period is revealed, there is a constant probability
p that the political will for further liberalization in future rounds is permanently lost,and
therefore that there will be no further liberalizing rounds in future periods. i.e.. tariffs will
26remain stationary at the lowest level sustainableatthat time. The timing of events and
decisions in the rest of the period is otherwise as before: first the state of the import-sector is
determined; then the state of political will is observed; then, governments set tariffs for the
period; and finally, workers make their allocation decisions.
It is apparent that I can no longer restrict my focus to monotonic liberalizations, since
the question I address now is whether a retreat from the progress of previous rounds is
inevitable when it becomes known that future rounds are impossible. However, I continue to
restrict my discussion to cases in which such a retreat, if it were indeed to occur, would be
sufficiently small to leave some of the import-competing workers whose import skills remain
intact still choosing to work outside the import-competing sector. This will ensure that, along
the equilibrium path, domestic import-competing prices continue to be fixed at w/(1 +y), and
therefore that workers' allocation decisions continue to depend only on the present-period's
tariffs.4
Suppose, then, that with p> 0 and fixed, the initial e1 was such that the most-
cooperative liberalization path would take n rounds to complete (reach free trade) if it did not
end "prematurely" (if governments did not loose their "political will" before the last round
was completed). I continue to define t as the most-cooperative tariff sustainable in the ilh
state of the import-competing sector, given that political will for further liberalization still
That is, I characterize cases where any equilibrium retreat from liberal trade policies is
sufficiently small that it does not undo more liberalization than was achieved in the preceding
round. This will ensure that workers who would care to reverse their allocation decisions and
return to the import-competing sector are limited to those that were displaced by the
preceding round and therefore still possess their import-competing skills.
27exists. With t denoting the stationary cooperative tariff that can be supported in the event
that the process of liberalization ends prematurely in state i, t(t1) is defined implicitly by
the incentive constraint that must hold in a period when political will has been lost, but the
import-competing sector is stilt in state i:
W (V', t, cT1) —W(t1, t) ￿ [W(t, t1)
(31)
—W1(tN,tIQ,ti_i)]
Defining K1 analogously to Z in the previous section, the incentive constraint for
t,iC 1,...n, giventhat the import-competing sector is in state i and governments still
maintain political will for further liberalization, is given by
w t51) - W(t,ti)￿ ]{(1-A) (1-p) W1(t,ti)
+ (i—A)p??1 ((t1),(rf_1) ) +ApP?141(IsCi,i (4),(4)
(32)
+ AC1—p) Lw1,1(tin,4.i) +K1,1]
} —
.A P.T1(t". t".
—1C C C = 4tj itj ,tj_1,tj,i, A1,1
Writtenin a form analogous to (28), (32) becomes
28P/1 (ci, i) + —2-—-1-w141 (C)?;.,(vi)





• ___. W1+1C?",r)] —_P_w(t (?f1) t51 (ef) )
As in the previous section, t(r..1)=O and.1(t2) canbe characterized using (32).
while t(t1)for I E(n—2,...,1)can he derived recursively using (33). starting with i=n-2
under the knowledge that free trade is reached in the th round. Figure 6 depicts f(t71) in
art analogous fashion to its depiction in Figure 5. But (31) determines t(t1),andthe
question of whether existing tariff levels can be sustained when the liberalization process
arrives at a premature end amounts to whether (r..1) -(r1)foric ( l,...,n I. or,
using (31) and (32), whether
R1(?1(r_1) ,t..1,ff,1(t1) ;k141(tff) ) 2 X1(t1=I(t5.1),ti_j) (34)
sinceat t, R,()mustdecline in tmoreslowly than the left-hand side of(32).
It is ctcar that the maximum t1fromwhich free trade can be reached in the th
round, t1,isequal to the maximum t1fromwhich free trade could be sustained in the flth
29round in the event political will for future liberalizations were lost, denoted by t in Figure
6. This reflects the fact that, with the nth round achieving free trade, the political will for
future rounds of liberalization is irrelevant. However, under my assumption that any
equilibrium retreat from liberal trade policies does not undo more liberalization than was
achieved in the previous round, it is straightforward to prove by contradiction using (34) that
> 7(t) for t1€[t1,rJ, since the discounted expected benefits of maintaining
cooperation along the equilibrium path, given that future liberalization from t(t71)is
expected--the left-hand side of (34)--must be greater than the discounted benefits of
maintaining stationary cooperation at t(4..1)--the right-hand side of(34). This is depicted in
Figure 6. The right-hand panel depicts the most cooperative liberalization path for a
hypothetical case taking three rounds to complete by the solid line, while the implications of
a loss of political will after the second round are depicted by the dashed line. Hence, the
political will for undertaking further liberalization is required to sustain current levels of
liberalization. Put differently, a premature end to the liberalization process must lead to a
retreat from the levels of tariff cutting achieved in previous rounds.
V. Conclusion
I have presented a model of trade liberalization in which "gradualism' is an
endogenous outcome. In order to do this, I have adopted many simplifying assumptions
along the way. Some of these assumptions are inessential for the results, but others are
30clearly more substantive. In thissection. 1close by commenting on twoofthe more
substantive.
First.I have focused onthe resource movements in and out of import-competing
sectorsduring the processofliberalization, buthaveignored the analogous resource
movements with regard toexportsectors. If resourcesmovinginto theexport sectormust
attain sectorspecificskills from which they then cam rents, the process I have modeled in the
import sector couldrun in reverseinthe export sector,eventually putting ahalt to
liberalizationwhen the rent-earning resources in the export sector grow sufficiently large
relative to the shrinking rent-earning resources in the import-competing sector. This
possibility might be attenuated somewhat if one thinks of investments in the skills of the
expanding industry as less industry-specific than those tailored to what is now a declining
industry. But it is still an important consideration that I have ignored.
Second, I have maintained the assumption throughout that the resources moving out of
the import-competing sector over time are atomistic. This is important, since knowing that
today'sdepartureof workers from the import-competing sector will set the stage for
tomorrow's liberalization would generally give those workers who remain in the sector today
an incentive to prevent the departure of their co-workers. In the formal model developed
here, there are no workers earning inframarginal rents along the equilibrium liberalization
path, but moregenerallysuch rents wouldbeearned, and those earning them would have an
incentive to "organize' to reduce the rate at which workers leave the import-competing sector,
and thus the rate of future tariff liberalization. Consideration of non-atomistic import-
31competing resources would surely complicate the model, but would provide an interesting and
important extension.
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